A Rosyid Al Atok, Muhamad Sayuti Hassan
The lawmaking process in Indonesia, as defined by the 1945 Constitution, features extensive presidential involvement in proposing bills, participating in deliberations, and enacting laws. This departs from most presidential systems, where the executive's role in lawmaking is more limited. This article examines whether Indonesia's model is a distinctive constitutional innovation or an anomaly that strains the separation of powers. Employing a normative legal methodology, it analyses constitutional provisions, implementing statutes, and comparative studies of presidential systems in the United States, South Africa, and Colombia. The analysis shows that Indonesia's model institutionalises intensive executive-legislative cooperation but also generates legal ambiguities, especially in agendasetting, budget formation, veto practice, and emergency legislation. These procedural uncertainties risk governance instability and blur classical boundaries between branches. The article argues that Indonesia represents a "colegislative presidency" that both departs from orthodox presidentialism and enriches comparative typologies of executive-legislative relations. Esta obra está bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Universitas Negeri Malang, Indonesia; Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia
